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ABSTRACT
A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep good
reputations so they can easily borrow more. Bulow and Rogoff show that this argument is invalid under
two conditions: (i) there is a single debt relationship, and (ii) regardless of their past actions, governments
can earn the (possibly state-contingent) market rate of return by saving abroad. Bulow and Rogoff
conjecture that, even under condition (ii), in more general reputation models with multiple relationships
and spillover across them, reputation may support debt. This paper shows what is needed for this
conjecture to be true.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. INTRODUCTION
The standard reputation argument for why sovereign governments repay debts is that
governments fear that if they default, their tarnished reputations will spill over to future debt
relationships and make bankers less willing to lend to them. (See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz
1981; Kletzer 1984; Manuelli 1986; Grossman and Van Huyck 1988; Atkeson 1991; and Cole, Dow,
and English 1995.) Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) challenge this traditional explanation. In a
provocative paper, they show that “under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must
be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors, and cannot be supported by a country’s
‘reputation for repayment’” (1989b, p. 43). A key reason for the difference between this result and
the results in the rest of the literature is that Bulow and Rogoff assume that regardless of its past
behavior, a government can earn the market rate of return on its savings by saving with foreign
bankers (possibly with full sets of state-contingent contracts and state-contingent payoffs).
1 The rest
of the literature, either explicitly or implicitly, assumes that if a country defaults, it cannot save.
Bulow and Rogoff go on to conjecture that reputation models of debt are not necessarily dead.
More precisely, Bulow and Rogoff conjecture that since countries are involved in a myriad of
relationships, reputation may be able to support debt even with their assumption if the analysis is
expanded from the partial reputation models that view debt in isolation to a general reputation model
that includes all the country’s relationships. In this paper, we examine the Bulow-Rogoff conjecture
in a model in which misbehavior in the debt arena tarnishes a government’s reputation in other
arenas. We ﬁnd that whether or not the conjecture holds depends critically on the nature of the other
relationship: if it is a repeated relationship, with constant per-period beneﬁts, it may hold; if it is a
dynamic relationship, with beneﬁts that depend on the values of state variables, it may not.
Bulow and Rogoff prove their result in a model with complete information, an inﬁnite
horizon, uncertainty, and a single debt relationship. To set up our later analysis, we begin by
reviewing how their result extends to a model with incomplete information, a ﬁnite horizon, no2
exogenous uncertainty, and a single debt relationship. Abstracting from exogenous uncertainty is of
no consequence; it simply makes the notation less cumbersome. Of more importance is our focus
on incomplete information. We allow a small amount of uncertainty about whether the government
attaches a large disutility to not honoring its contracts. (For some related work in industrial
organization using reputation models with incomplete information, see Kreps and Wilson 1982 or
Milgrom and Roberts 1982. For some related work in international economics, see Eaton 1992.
2)
Our result is in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff: with a single debt relationship, reputation can
support effectively zero debt.
We then turn to the main analysis and expand our partial reputation model, in which the debt
relationship is modeled in isolation, to a general reputation model which includes all of a country’s
relationships. We capture this expanded view by adding to the simple model one other relationship.
In this analysis, we focus on another relationship which has constant per-period beneﬁts. We call it
a domestic labor relationship, but it can be interpreted in many other ways. We ﬁnd that even if
there is a vanishingly small amount of uncertainty about the type of the government, the unique
equilibrium of our model has reputation supporting as much debt as there would be under full
commitment. That is, we show that there are circumstances under which a general reputation can
support large amounts of positive debt.
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate Bulow and Rogoff’s conjecture about the
ability of reputation to support debt. The results here clarify the circumstances under which their
conjecture holds. For it to hold, two conditions must be satisﬁed. First, misbehavior in the debt
relationship must spill over to another relationship. For this condition to hold requires only a trivial
amount of uncertainty in the minds of the lenders and the workers about whether the government
might honor its contracts for some reason other than the readily observable costs and beneﬁts it faces.
Second, the payoffs in the other relationship must yield net beneﬁts from maintaining a good
reputation which are, in some sense, both large enough and persistent enough. In general, for these3
net beneﬁts to be calculated, the whole equilibrium must be calculated, and simple conditions cannot
be put on the primitives of the environment to ensure that the resulting spillover is enough to support
large amounts of debt. In the special, but common, setup in which the other relationship is a simple
repeated one, these net beneﬁts are constant, and simple conditions on the primitives of the
environment can be calculated which ensure that large amounts of debt can be supported by spillover.
A secondary contribution of our paper is to exposit a model of a country’s general reputation
which is potentially interesting in its own right. Indeed, if the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) paper is
viewed as having killed the standard reputation models (and having laid the groundwork for the
subsequent direct-sanctions approach adopted by Bulow and Rogoff 1989a, Fernandez and Rosenthal
1990, and others), then this paper can be viewed as reviving the reputation approach.
2. AN ECONOMY WITH ONE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
We begin with an incomplete-information economy that consists of two countries and lasts
a ﬁnite number of periods. One country has a number of risk-neutral bankers. The other country is
represented by the government, which has access to a country-speciﬁc investment project and needs
to borrow resources to fund it. There are two types of government: a normal government and an
honest government. A normal government is risk-neutral and discounts the future at rate b.A n
honest government has the same utility as the normal one except that it experiences a large disutility
from breaking contracts. The type of the government is private information. Bankers hold subjective
beliefs about what type the government is, and they update these beliefs after seeing the actions of
the government. We will show that in this economy, reputation can support effectively zero debt.
To show this, we set up and deﬁne a Bayesian equilibrium. We show that as the bankers’ prior belief
that the government is honest shrinks to zero in an appropriate fashion, the associated equilibrium
converges to one with zero debt.
Speciﬁcally, in each period t, t = 0, ..., T, the economy has a perishable consumption-capital
good. Bankers are risk-neutral, live for one period, have a discount factor b, and are endowed with4
a large amount of the consumption-capital good in each period. Without loss of generality, we
suppose that each period has two bankers, who are denoted i = 1, 2. The normal government has
these preferences:
(1)
T
t=0
btct,
where ct is the government’s consumption in period t. The honest government has these same
preferences except that if it fails to honor a contract it has signed, its utility is the expression in (1)
minus a large positive constant M. In each period t, an investment of xt units in period t produces
output of Atxt units in period t + 1. Here At is a deterministically ﬂuctuating productivity parameter
that speciﬁes the investment project’s gross return. For simplicity, we assume that
(2) At =
ì
ï
í
ï
î
ü
ï
ý
ï
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A, if t is odd
0, if t is even
.
(Letting productivity ﬂuctuate is an easy way to give the government an incentive to borrow. This
simple pattern of ﬂuctuations makes the resulting borrowing pattern simple, but is otherwise
inessential.) The project has a maximal size of 1 in the sense that xt £ 1. Throughout the paper, we
will assume that the discount factor satisﬁes this condition:
(3) bA>1
as well as b < 1. The government is endowed with x0 = 0 units of the consumption-capital good at
the beginning of period 0.
A precise description of the timing of events in the model is as follows. In each period t, the
government starts with new output, Atxt, and the value of debt either owed or saved, Rtbt, where Rt
is the gross interest rate and bt is the amount borrowed by the government att–1 . T h egovernment
decides whether to repay old loans subject to this constraint:
(4) ztRtbt £ Atxt,5
where zt = 1 corresponds to repayment by the government and zt = 0, to default. Each banker i = 1,
2, having seen the default decision as well as the past actions of all agents, ﬁrst offers the government
a gross interest rate R
i
t+1. Then, after bankers have seen each other’s interest rate offers, they each
offer a loan size b
i
t+1. (By allowing bankers to condition their loan sizes on their competitor’s interest
rate offer, we avoid the possible nonexistence of equilibrium with pure strategies for lenders, as
discussed in a related context by Jaffee and Russell 1976.) A loan contract st+1 is a pair (Rt+1,bt+1)
that speciﬁes a gross interest rate and a loan amount. Let St+1 denote the set of loan contracts offered.
The government is thus offered loan contracts s
i
t+1 by bankers i = 1, 2, and so St+1 =( s
1
t+1,s
2
t+1).
Faced with such a set of contracts, the government chooses a contract and randomizes if there are
ties. The government also chooses how much to consume, ct, and invest, xt+1, subject to a constraint
on the maximal size of the project,
(5) xt £ 1,
and on the government’s budget,
(6) ct +x t+1 –b t+1 =A t x t–z t R t b t .
To build intuition, let us begin by examining an economy in which institutions are such that
agents in both countries can commit to repaying their loans. Competition between bankers ensures
that in each period t, the equilibrium gross rate of interest on loans is Rt = r, where rº1/b. From
(3), we know that the return on the project, A, is greater than r; hence, with such an interest rate in
each even-numbered period, the government optimally borrows to fully fund the project. Thus, in
each even-numbered period, starting with period 0, the government borrows 1, invests it, and
consumes 0. In the next odd-numbered period, the project yields A units of output, out of which the
government repays the banker r, consumes the rest A – r, and borrows 0. The discounted value of
utility under commitment is, thus,
(7) (A–r)+b
2 (A–r)+b
4 (A–r) + ... = A–r
1–b 2.6
Of course, given that the government has linear preferences and that the discount factor of the
government b satisﬁes b =1 / r , the timing of consumption by the government can be structured in
a variety of ways to yield the same discounted value of utility.
Consider now the environment without such commitment. We set up and deﬁne equilibrium
as follows. The history ht = {[z0,S1,s1,x1,c0],...,[zt–1,St,st,xt,ct–1]} records past actions of the
government and the bankers up to period t. A strategy for the government at t is a probability of
repaying s
i
t(ht), i = n, h (normal or honest), at the beginning of the period together with loan contract,
investment, and consumption decisions denoted st+1(ht,zt,St+1), xt+1(ht,zt,St+1), and ct(ht,zt,St+1) made
after both the realization of repayment decision zt and the offer of the new set of loan contracts St+1.
A strategy for each banker i = 1, 2 at t is an interest rate R
i
t+1(ht,zt) and a loan size b
i
t+1(ht,zt,Rt+1),
where Rt+1 =( R
1
t+1,R
2
t+1). We let St+1(ht,zt,Rt+1) denote the set of such contracts. Bankers also have
a set of common beliefs, or priors, pt(ht) that gives the probability of the government being honest
conditional on the history.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies for the normal and honest governments
and a set of strategies and beliefs for the bankers that satisfy the following conditions: (i) For each
history, given the strategies and beliefs of the bankers from t onward and given the strategies of the
governments from t + 1 onward, the strategies of the governments at t maximize the governments’
payoffs among the set of strategies that satisfy (4)–(6) and s
i
t+1(ht,zt,St+1) Î St+1(ht,zt,Rt+1) for i = n,
h. (ii) For each history, given the strategies of the governments, the strategy of the other banker at
t, and the beliefs of banker j, the strategy of banker j maximizes this banker’s payoffs forj=1 ,2 .
(iii) Bankers’ beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule.
Notice that in the above setup, bankers are not allowed to default. One interpretation of this
assumption is that bankers have a commitment device that commits them to honoring all contracts
they sign. It will be clear that in any equilibrium, regardless of the government’s past actions, if the
government wants to save any amount (any bt+1 < 0), then the bankers will oblige them and,7
moreover, competition among bankers will drive the interest rate on such savings up to Rt+1 = r.W e
will sometimes refer to these bankers as Swiss bankers in order to emphasize the feature that they are
willing to let any government save with them regardless of the government’s reputation.
We have shown in previous work (Cole and Kehoe 1995) that the level of borrowing in this
economy is effectively zero. To do so, we used a standard (but complicated) backward induction
argument to compute the equilibrium for this economy. We showed that if the initial prior and the
initial capital were small enough, then the equilibrium value of utility and the initial borrowing level
were both close to 0. To make this sense of closeness precise, we considered a sequence of
economies in which the prior shrank to zero as the horizon length converged to inﬁnity. More
precisely, we proved this proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. Consider a sequence of economies indexed by the horizon length T, with b <1 ,i n
which the initial prior p0(T) converges to 0 as T converges to inﬁnity. Along this sequence, the
equilibrium discounted value of utility converges to 0, and the initial borrowing converges to 0.
3. AN ECONOMY WITH MULTIPLE TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
In this section, we add to the model of Section 2 other relationships that involve trust. For
another relationship to help support debt, we need misbehavior in the debt relationship to spill over
and tarnish the government’s reputation in the added relationship. It turns out that a small amount
of incomplete information similar to that in Section 2 will generate such spillover in equilibrium. We
also need the net beneﬁts of maintaining a good reputation to be both large and persistent. We
illustrate these conditions by means of some very simple examples. It will be clear that more
elaborate examples can be constructed along the same lines.
Clearly, the most trivial way to add another trust relationship to the model above is to add
another debt relationship with another group of bankers in another country which simply replicates
the ﬁrst. Let’s do that. Let the information setup be the same as before except that the honest8
government suffers a loss in utility if it breaks contracts with either group of bankers. In any
Bayesian equilibrium of the model, the honest government will honor all contracts with both groups
if the utility cost of breaking them is sufficiently large. Thus, if either group of bankers sees a
government break either type of contract, the bankers will know for sure that the government is not
honest. A simple backward induction argument implies that bankers will never lend to a government
they know is not honest. Hence, the normal government will either honor both contracts or break
both, since breaking either causes the government to lose its reputation. Thus, reputation from the
trust involved in one debt relationship spills over to the trust involved in the other and vice versa.
A moment’s reﬂection should make it clear that even though there is spillover across the debt
relationships, only the same level of effectively zero debt that could be supported with the single debt
relationship can be supported here. Since both the beneﬁts and the costs of defaulting in the model
with two projects are simply twice what they are in the model with one project, the default decisions
are unchanged. Hence, even with spillover from one debt relationship to another, no more debt can
be supported than could be before.
While this exercise is useful, it is somewhat special because the added relationship is totally
symmetric to the existing one. We need to see that even if misbehavior in the debt relationship spills
over to a very different type of relationship, this spillover may not support debt. For example, in
Cole and Kehoe (1994), we show that spillover to a relationship involving exhaustible resources may
not support debt. However, if the other relationship is the typical repeated relationship studied in
almost all of the game theory literature, then the results may be different. We illustrate this point by
considering a simple repeated labor relationship in which the per-period beneﬁts are constant.
Consider adding a labor relationship to the debt model. This labor relationship emanates from
a project that is available in each period. If the number of workers hired at the beginning of the
period is Nt, then the project’s output that same period is ANt. The project has a maximal size of
N in the sense that Nt £ N. (The assumption that the labor project has the same productivity as the9
debt project in odd-numbered periods is for notational simplicity only.) The economy has a large
number of workers who have the specialized skills the government needs to run the project. Each
of these workers is risk-neutral and has an alternative employment opportunity that earns a worker
w units with certainty in each period. We assume that
(8) bA ³w .
We will model the government as maximizing its utility, subject to its resource constraints. With a
little more notation, we could reinterpret the model as one in which the government maximizes the
welfare of its citizens, provides public goods by using specialized resources, and taxes in a distort-
ing way.
For the sake of intuition, note that under commitment, the allocations are as follows. In
period 0, the government borrows and invests 1, hires N workers, and consumes 0. In period 1, the
investment and labor projects yield a total ofA+A Nunits of output, out of which the government
pays the bankers r and pays the workers wN. The government borrows and invests 0 and consumes
(A–r) + (A–w)N. In period 2 and any even-numbered period after that, the labor project yields AN,
out of which the government pays the workers wN and consumes (A–w)N. The government also
borrows 1 and invests it. Here, as in Section 2 with linear preferences and b =1 / r , the timing of
consumption by the government can be structured in a variety of ways to yield the same discounted
value of utility.
Now consider the model without commitment. The timing of the model is the same as before,
with these additions. In the beginning of each period, each of the large number of workers offers an
employment schedule. Each worker i offers to supply nt(i,wt) units of labor to the government for
a promise of wt units of pay, where nt is either 0 or 1. Confronted with a continuum of such wage
schedules, all of which are identical, the government announces some particular wage wt together with
an employment cap Nt. The output of the project is realized immediately. After that, the government
decides whether or not to honor its contracts with the bankers and the workers. We let z
b
t = 1 and10
z
n
t = 1 correspond to honoring the debt and labor contracts. The constraints faced by the government
are
(9) z
b
tRtbt +z
n
tw t N t£A t x t+A N t
together with
(10) ct +x t+1 –b t+1 =A t x t+A N t–z
b
tR t b t–z
n
tw t N t
and
(11) xt+1 £ 1 and Nt £ N.
In (10), we have assumed that the number of workers is Nt.
The speciﬁcation of the governments is similar to that before. There are two types of govern-
ment: a normal government and an honest government. A normal government is risk-neutral and
discounts the future at rate b.A n honest government evaluates consumption streams the same way
as the normal government, but an honest government also assigns a large disutility to breaking any
contract it has signed, that is, either the debt contract or the labor contract. In particular, we can write
the preferences of an honest government as
(12) b
tct – (1–z
b
t)M
b – (1–z
n
t)M
n,
T
t=0
where M
b and M
n are large positive numbers. (Recall that z
b
t = 1 and z
n
t = 1 correspond to honoring
the debt and labor contracts and z
b
t = 0 and z
n
t = 0 correspond to defaulting on these contracts.) The
type of the government is private information. Both bankers and workers hold subjective beliefs
about what type the government is, and they update these beliefs after seeing the actions of the
government.
The same logic we used above with two debt relationships should make clear here that in any
Bayesian equilibrium of this model, the honest government will honor all debt and labor contracts
if M
b and M
n are sufficiently large, which we will henceforth assume to be true. Thus, if a private
agent, either a banker or a worker, sees the government default on either type of contract, the agent11
will know for sure that the government is not honest. A simple backward induction argument implies
that workers will never work for, or bankers lend to, a government that they know is not honest.
Hence, the normal government will either honor both contracts or default on both, since defaulting
on either one causes the government to lose its reputation. Thus, the reputation from the trust
involved in the debt relationship necessarily spills over to the trust involved in the labor relationship
and vice versa.
One way to analyze the model’s implications for government borrowing is to compute the
equilibrium directly by backward induction. However, a more convenient way is to develop some
simple properties of the equilibrium indirectly. To do that, we ﬁrst backtrack a little: we consider
a model that has only a labor project and develop in that model an expression for the value of
reputation in the labor relationship alone. We then consider the model with both the debt and labor
relationships. We use the result that losing trust in the debt relationship spills over to the labor
relationship to show how the full commitment level of debt can be supported.
Consider the model in which we set xt =b t= 0 for all t. The formal deﬁnition of a Bayesian
equilibrium is similar to the one in the previous section; here we proceed more informally. In the
Bayesian equilibrium that we consider, the workers’ beliefs about the government are summarized
by a conditional probability that the government is honest. We denote this conditional probability
a ttb yp tand call it the reputation of the government. In this equilibrium, the history of past events
at the beginning of period t is summarized by the conditional probability pt. The strategies of agents
are allowed to depend on pt together with the actions that have already occurred within the period.
Thus, the work decision of worker i can be written as nt(i,wt,pt). The model’s interesting equilibria
turn out to involve the government randomizing, or mixing, over whether or not to honor its contract.
Let s
n
t denote the probability that the normal government honors the contract. The equilibrium we
compute has two requirements: At every possible state, each agent acts optimally, given the strategies
and beliefs of other agents, and beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule wherever possible. Since12
the honest government never defaults on contracts (s
h
t º 1), Bayes’ rule implies that the probability
that the government is honest at t + 1, conditional on honoring its contract at t (and all previous
periods), is
(13) pt+1 =
pt
pt + (1–pt)s
n
t
.
In each period t, each of the N workers will supply one unit of labor if the expected wage is greater
than or equal to w. If the honest government always honors contracts and the normal government
honors them with probability st, then at an offered wage of
(14) wt = w
pt + (1–pt)s
n
t
,
the workers will receive an expected wage of w. Hiring workers will only be proﬁtable for the honest
government if the wage rate is less than the return on the project, that is, if
(15) wt £ A.
Backward induction works in this model exactly as it does in the standard Kreps-Wilson
(1982) and Milgrom-Roberts (1982) models of the chain store paradox. Solving backward to period
0 gives the following value function:
(16) V0(p0,T) =
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T–1
s=0 bs(A–w)N + bTAN if w/A £ p0 £ 1
T–2
s=0 bs(A–w)N + bT–1AN if (w/A)2 £ p0 < w/A
(A–w)N + bAN if (w/A)T £ p0 <( w /A)T–1
AN if (w/A)T+1 £ p0 <( w /A)T
0i f p 0 <( w /A)T+1
.
This value function corresponds to the following equilibrium behavior. In the lowest region, deﬁned
by p0 <( w /A)
T+1, no mixing probability is both high enough to give a wage w0 < A and low enough
to push up next period’s prior into the next-highest region. Hence, workers do not work at period13
0. Workers do not revise their priors, and then p1 =p 0 , and workers do not work at period 1, and
so on. The value of utility is, thus, zero. In the next-highest region, with (w/A)
T+1 £ p0 <( w /A)
T,
workers work, and the government is just indifferent between currently defaulting on its contract and
honoring it. Thus, the value of utility is AN. In the next-highest region, with (w/A)
T £ p0 <( w /A)
T–1,
the government strictly prefers to honor its contract this period and start mixing the next period.
Thus, today it gets (A–w)N units of consumption; from tomorrow on, the value of its utility is AN;
and its total utility is (A–w)N + bAN. For the next-highest region, the government strictly prefers
to honor the contract for two periods and then start mixing, which gives it a total utility of (A–w)N
+ b(A–w)N + b
2AN, and so on.
Consider now the equilibrium behavior for a ﬁxed prior p0 as the time horizon lengthens.
Suppose k is an integer such that
(17) (w/A)
k+1 £ p0 <( w /A)
k.
Then the government honors its contracts for sure in the ﬁrst T – k periods. In periods T–k+1
through T – 1, it will mix, and in period T, it will default. As T gets longer, so does the length of
time that the government honors its contracts for sure, and in the limit, the government never defaults.
This equilibrium has a feature that we will use later. Given any initial prior p0 > 0, let k(p0)
be the integer such that (17) holds. Thus, in period T – k(p0), the government is just indifferent
between defaulting on and honoring its contracts, and the value of either is AN. One period earlier,
at T – k(p0) – 1, the value of honoring is (A–w)N + bAN, or
(18) AN + (bA–w)N.
By assumption, bA>1>w , so that as we move back one period, the value of honoring contracts
strictly increases while the value of defaulting remains ﬁxed at AN. Thus, there is a strictly positive
gap of (bA–w)N between these values. Continuing in this manner, we see from (16) that j periods
beforeT–k ( p 0 ) the value of honoring contracts can be rewritten as
(19) AN + , (1–bj)
1–b
( b A–w)N14
while the value of defaulting is simply AN. Thus, the gap between the value of honoring and the
value of defaulting monotonically increases as we move back in time fromT–k ( p 0 ).
We will construct borrowing, investing, and repaying allocations which coincide with the full
commitment levels for all but a ﬁxed, ﬁnite number of periods at the end of the game. Given some
k¢, let these allocations specify that the government follow the full commitment allocations before
T–k ¢and at T – k¢ switch to self-ﬁnancing the investment project. More precisely, given some k¢
chosen such that T – k¢ i so d df o rt=T–k ¢ , let these allocations specify that out of total output A
+ AN, the government repay bankers r and pay workers wN. Now, instead of borrowing 0 and
consuming the rest, the government saves 1/r and consumes the rest. In periodT–k ¢+ 1 and each
even-numbered period thereafter, the government receives AN from the labor project and 1 from the
savings. The government invests 1, hires N workers, and consumes (A–w)N. In periodT–k ¢+2
and each odd-numbered period thereafter, the government receives a total output of A + AN, repays
bankers 0, pays workers wN, saves 1/r, and consumes the rest, namely, (A–1/r) + (A–wN).
For what k¢ can these allocations be supported in the reputation model with both a debt project
and a labor project? To compute this number, ignore spillover for a moment, and consider only the
direct costs and beneﬁts of defaulting on the debt contract with the bankers. In any period t £ T–
k ¢ , the net beneﬁts of defaulting on the debt contract are simply the saving of funds used to repay the
loan, namely, r. F o rt>T–k ¢ , there are no loans, so the net beneﬁts of defaulting are zero. Now
add back in the spillover effects. For some given prior p0,i fw es e tk ¢= k(p0) + 1, the difference
between the value of honoring both debt and labor contracts and defaulting on them in period T –
k¢ is (bA–w)N – r. In any odd-numbered period before this, the net beneﬁts of defaulting on the
debt contract are the same, namely, r, while the gap between honoring and defaulting on the labor
contract increases. In any even-numbered period, there is no debt and thus no beneﬁt to defaulting.
In any later period, there is no debt, so the net beneﬁts of defaulting on it are obviously zero. Thus,
if15
(20) r <( b A–w)N,
then it is possible to support the full commitment allocations from period 0 through periodT–k ¢
with k¢ = k(p0) + 1. More generally, for any given b, let j(b) be the ﬁrst integer such that the net
beneﬁts of defaulting on the debt contract are smaller than the net gains from paying the workers;
namely,
(21) r < (1–bj)
1–b
( b A–w)N.
If T – [k(p0)+j ( b )] is odd, let k¢ = k(p0)+j ( b ), and otherwise, let k¢ = k(p0)+j ( b ) – 1. Then, using
the same reasoning as before, we can support the full commitment allocations up to periodT–k ¢ .
Next consider the strategies in this equilibrium. For computational reasons, we have found
it convenient to express these strategies as functions of the state variable pt. Of course, the more
general way of deﬁning strategies in game theory is to deﬁne them as functions of the entire history
of past actions of the players. It is obvious that fort<T–k ¢ , the strategies of the normal
government, the bankers, and the workers are such that if the government has never defaulted on
either contract, the lenders and workers continue with their full commitment actions, while if it has
defaulted, bankers do not lend and workers do not work. (Of course, for t ³ T–k¢, these strategies
are somewhat more complicated.) We summarize our discussion with
PROPOSITION 2. There exists a b Î (0,1) such that for all bÎ( b ,1), the equilibrium allocations
coincide with those under full commitment from period 0 through period T – k¢, where k¢ = k(p0)+
j ( b ) .
There is a precise sense in which the allocations in the economy with multiple trust
relationships converge to the full commitment allocations even though the amount of uncertainty
about the type of government becomes arbitrarily small. To understand that precise sense, consider
the following:16
Condition. The sequence of priors, p(T), satisﬁes
(22) (r/A)
k(T)+1 £ p0( T )<( r /A)
k(T),
where k(T) converges monotonically to inﬁnity as T does and T – k(T) converges to inﬁnity.
Since r/A < 1, clearly p0(T) monotonically converges to zero as T converges to inﬁnity. Now
consider a sequence of economies indexed by T and p0(T). Along such a sequence, the importance
of the honest government is monotonically declining to zero. Notice that in a sense, the prior is
shrinking to zero more slowly than the horizon length is growing to inﬁnity.
Now consider a sequence of economies indexed by T and p0(T), where p0(T) satisﬁes the
above condition. Let b be such that (21) is satisﬁed for some ﬁnite j(b). Using (16) and the above
analysis, we can show straightforwardly that the equilibrium value of utility converges to the full
commitment level.
4. INTERPRETATION AND EXTENSIONS
As we mentioned in the introduction, one contribution of this paper is to investigate the
conditions under which the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) result holds. The results of Section 3 clarify
when it will hold and when it won’t. Another contribution of the paper is to exposit a model of the
general reputation of countries which may be interesting in its own right. With this in mind, let’s
discuss the plausibility of the assumptions.
Our main results depend on there being some reputation spillover across different arenas of
behavior. We obtained these results by assuming a small amount of uncertainty about whether the
government is an honest type. But how should this assumption be interpreted? We adopt an
interpretation in the spirit of that given by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
in the chain store paradox literature. In a chain store game, in order for a monopolist to deter the
entry of incumbents, these researchers allow a small probability that there is an irrational monopolist
who ﬁghts any entrant. In their work, all of the interesting theorems are proven as limits as the17
probability of this irrational type goes to zero and the number of periods of the game goes to inﬁnity.
The interpretation these researchers give for their assumption is that there really is no irrational type;
rather, this setup captures a vanishingly small uncertainty in the minds of the potential entrants that
they may be facing a monopolist who plays tough. The normal monopolist understands that
incumbents have this trivial amount of doubt, and it is exploited to build the monopolist a reputation.
Indeed, Selten (1978) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) think that the case of absolutely zero
uncertainty in the minds of players (including uncertainty about other players possibly being
uncertain) is unrealistic and, moreover, that this case generates predictions inconsistent with plausible
behavior.
We interpret our uncertainty assumption in the same way. We think of the uncertainty about
government honesty as being in the minds of agents who are in trust relationships with a country
about the motives of the government for behaving well in any relationship. As long as the agents
are not completely certain that there are no potential adverse consequences to the government in
another relationship (or, at least, as long as this fact is not common knowledge to all other such
agents), an equilibrium like ours should exist.
At an intuitive level, the basic idea here is that if someone is thought to be sleazy or
untrustworthy in one relationship, the person will be thought of as likely to be sleazy or untrustworthy
in other relationships. At this level, the idea applies to everything from business relationships to
dating relationships—to just about any relationships that involve trust. Applied to relationships
among nations, this idea seems quite plausible.
In terms of extensions of our work, recall that we interpret the model as having Swiss bankers
who allow any agent to save with them, regardless of the agent’s reputation. Imagine that in this
model, we added Swiss bankers who would sign and honor any contract for which they were both
paid up front and given the market rate of return. In such a model, imagine trying to break the
equilibrium we considered with the following deviation. In the ﬁrst period, the workers work for the18
government and the government defaults on the labor contract. The government then gives the goods
to a Swiss banker, with instructions to pay w to any worker who works for the government the next
period. This type of deviation continues for all future periods. If this deviation were both feasible
and proﬁtable, it would break our equilibrium.
There are several ways to amend the model so that such a deviation does not work. The
simplest is to assume that, after a Swiss banker pays the wages to the domestic worker, the
government can conﬁscate them. Clearly, then, the original equilibrium would remain. Another way
to amend the model is to add some private information known to the private agents and the
government. Suppose the government is involved with a large number of possibly very heterogeneous
types of domestic agents who each can provide some valuable work effort. Then, even if the hours
of each and every agent are publicly observable, if the effort and the quality of output are the private
information of the private agents and the government, then the Swiss banker would not be able to
duplicate the government’s payment schedule. The inefficiency of having the Swiss banker
administer the contracts could be used to construct a reputation equilibrium similar to the one
considered here. Yet another way to amend the model is to let the maximal size of the labor project
grow. If the rate of growth of the project were sufficiently high, then the contemplated deviation
would not be proﬁtable. This growing labor project might capture the idea that in a developing
economy, the size and value of the government’s relationships involving trust are continually
expanding.
Finally, note that there are clearly other types of uncertainty about the types of government
which would not generate reputation spillover. It should be obvious, however, that regardless of what
other types of government exist, as long as at least one type attaches a large disutility to breaking
both contracts, reputation will still support lending. Indeed, the equilibrium of the model then is
similar to the analysis here.
5. CONCLUSION19
We have examined the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) conjecture that since actual economies are
involved in a myriad of relationships, general reputation models with potential spillover across
relationships may be able to support good outcomes. We have found that in a class of models, this
conjecture does not hold if reputation spills over to other relationships with only transient beneﬁts,
but it does hold if reputation spills over to a relationship with enduring beneﬁts.
The idea that an agent’s reputation in one relationship may spill over to other relationships
is certainly not new. However, in most of the literature, the spillover is such that actions of agents
in one arena of behavior affect reputation in that arena only. In the debt literature, for example, if
a government defaults on a loan, it ruins its reputation in the debt arena; in the industrial organization
literature on entry deterrence, if an incumbent doesn’t ﬁght entry, it ruins the incumbent’s reputation
in the entry-deterrence arena. Here we have shown that when the spillover stays within the debt
arena, reputation cannot support lending. For reputation to support lending, a government’s actions
in the debt arena must spill over to a different arena, such as labor relationships. Viewed this way,
the beneﬁts of maintaining a good relationship in one arena cannot be calculated simply by looking
at that arena alone. Instead, account must be taken of the ramiﬁcations in a variety of other arenas,
which, at least on the surface, may not seem to be directly connected to the original arena, where
misbehavior might occur.
This basic idea can be applied in many contexts. It might explain why countries honor some
commitments, like treaties, when a narrow cost/beneﬁt analysis would recommend breaking them.
Consider, for example, a ﬁshing treaty between the United States and Canada. Suppose that at the
time the treaty was signed, it seemed like a good idea, but later developments revealed that the treaty
was costing the United States a lot. Nonetheless, the United States might honor the treaty because
breaking it would damage its reputation with Canada in other arenas that involve trust. Moreover,
breaking that treaty might cause a negative reputation spillover to, say, Japan in a completely different
arena that involves a trust relationship, such as a mutual defense pact.2021
Notes
1Others have looked at other conditions for the existence of a reputation equilibrium.
Pesendorfer (1992) considers a scenario in which the government must assemble an optimal portfolio
from existing ﬁnancial assets in the world market. Pesendorfer shows that even if the set of world
assets is complete, adding the restriction that each asset in the portfolio must be held in a positive
position may force the government to bear risk. The fear of bearing such risk may be sufficient to
give the government an incentive to repay its debt. Mohr (1991) shows that a reputation equilibrium
might exist in an overlapping generations model if a government can run a type of rational Ponzi
scheme.
2Eaton (1992), following Diamond (1989), considers a reputation model which has two types
of borrowers: “good” borrowers, for whom the lender can costlessly destroy output if they default,
and “normal” borrowers, for whom the lender cannot do that. Eaton, however, assumes that there
is no way to save after a default, so his model does not satisfy the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b)
assumption on the ability to save.22
REFERENCES
ATKESON, A., “International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation,” Econometrica 59
(July 1991), 1069–1089.
BULOW,J .AND K. ROGOFF, “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,” Journal of
Political Economy 97 (February 1989a), 155–178.
__________, “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?” American Economic Review 79 (March
1989b), 43–50.
COLE, H. L., J. DOW, AND W. B. ENGLISH, “Default, Settlement and Signalling: Lending Resumption
in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt,” International Economic Review 36 (May 1995),
365–385.
COLE,H .L .AND P. J. KEHOE, “Reputation Spillover Across Relationships with Enduring and
Transient Beneﬁts: Reviving Reputation Models of Debt,” Research Department Working
Paper 534, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1994.
__________, “The Role of Institutions in Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt,” Journal of
Monetary Economics 35 (February 1995), 45–64.
DIAMOND, D. W., “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 97
(August 1989), 828–862.
EATON, J., “Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms,” manuscript, Boston University, 1992.
EATON,J .AND M. GERSOVITZ, “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies 48 (April 1981), 289–309.
FERNANDEZ,R .AND R. W. ROSENTHAL, “Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations,”
Review of Economic Studies 57 (July 1990), 331–349.
GROSSMAN,H .I .AND J. B. VAN HUYCK, “Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default,
Repudiation, and Reputation,” American Economic Review 78 (December 1988), 1088–1097.23
JAFFEE,D .M .AND T. RUSSELL, “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November 1976), 651–666.
KLETZER, K. M., “Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk,”
Economic Journal 94 (June 1984), 287–307.
KREPS,D .M .AND R. B. WILSON, “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic
Theory 27 (August 1982), 253–279.
MANUELLI, R., “A General Equilibrium Model of International Credit Markets,” manuscript, Stanford
University, 1986.
MILGROM,P .AND J. ROBERTS, “Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence,” Journal of Economic
Theory 27 (August 1982), 280–312.
MOHR, E., Economic Theory and Sovereign International Debt (London: Academic Press, 1991).
PESENDORFER, W., “Sovereign Debt: Forgiving and Forgetting Reconsidered,” Discussion Paper 1016,
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern
University, 1992.
SELTEN, R., “The Chain Store Paradox,” Theory and Decision 9 (1978), 127–159. Reprinted in A.
Rubinstein, ed., Game Theory in Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in
Economics, no. 5 (Aldershot, Harts, England: Elgar, 1990), 265–297.